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Abstract
This article, drawing on the latest insights into organisational
silence, considers how employers seek to withhold information
and circumvent meaningful workplace voice when confronted
with regulatory requirements. It offers novel theoretical
insights by redefining employer silencing as characterised by
the withholding of information and the restriction of work-
place dialogue. In outlining three principal routes of non-com-
pliance—avoidance, suppression, and neglect—we empirically
illustrate the path to silence in the regulatory context of the
European Union Directive establishing a general framework
for informing and consulting employees. Rather than consider-
ing how employers utilised the regulations, as existing research
considers, we look at how employers circumvented the regula-
tory space in three case studies in the United Kingdom and
Ireland and the significant role of employer silencing as a tool
for explaining this dynamic.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Many employers have the incentive and capacity to withhold information from and avoid dialogue with their
workforce. In terms of scholarly conceptualisation, the issue of non-disclosure of information and circumvention
of dialogue by employers can be understood as a form of silence (Barry, Dundon, & Wilkinson, 2018; Morrison,
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2014). Although the silence-voice literature traditionally focuses on how employees withhold information and
refrain from speaking up, we focus on how employers withhold information and restrict workplace dialogue.
Indeed, to conceptualise silence in this way offers an important analytical tool in enhancing understanding of
employee voice. Whereas the latter looks at the ways and means in which employees can express their views
within the workplace, employer silencing, in contrast, considers the agency of how employers silence employee
voice by failing to either disclose information or abstaining from genuine dialogue, which is a vital precursor for
meaningful employee voice to occur in the first instance. Employer silencing is understood here as management
engaging in acts of silencing workers through the withholding of information and the restriction of workplace dia-
logue. Employer silencing is analytically distinct from extrapolating the presence or absence of employee voice
policies and practice, and it differs from workers remaining silent in response to management. As such, this article
breaks new ground by advancing the concept of employer silencing of employee voice to improve understanding
of the nuanced duality of voice-silence dynamics in employment relations and human resource management
(HRM) scholarship.
Regulatory context is essential in enabling or constraining employer silence. The broader regulatory context in
many jurisdictions can constrain employer efforts to engage in silence on a variety of matters (Emmenegger, 2015;
Marchington, 2015). For example, there has been growth in many countries of “hard” and “soft” regulations provid-
ing for more social dialogue in the workplace. The most notable developments in recent decades is the European
Union (EU) Directive Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees (2002/14/EC,
hitherto the Information and Consultation (I&C) Directive; Gold, 2010). These regulations potentially constrain
employer attempts to withhold information and avoid consultation with the workforce.
The existence of regulatory constraint raises a question over how employers preserve silence in response to reg-
ulatory requirements intended to do the opposite, that is, legislation aimed at establishing information disclosure and
workforce dialogue. Current research on the I&C Directive, for example, examines how employers use the regula-
tions to provide information and create consultation mechanisms. In this article, however, we focus on how the
Directive's intended benchmarks are subject to a typology of non-compliance behaviours, effectively routes to
employer silence. Specifically, our typology of regulatory non-compliance identifies three ways by which employers
withhold information and restrict dialogue despite legal requirements to establish their precise opposite; these are
“avoidance,” “suppression,” or “neglect.” The article illustrates these three routes empirically by using qualitative case
studies derived from studying how regulations providing for greater information disclosure and dialogue via the I&C
WHAT IS CURRENTLY KNOWN ABOUT THE SUBJECT MATTER
• Existing research sees silence as employee-led/workers choose to withhold voice;
• Existing research examines how the European Union Directive for Informing and Consulting Employees, and
national laws, is utilised.
WHAT THE PAPER ADDS TO THIS
• Organisational silence can be employer-led (“employer silencing”);
• Novel insights in defining employer silencing as “management engaging in acts of silencing workers”;
• New typology of employer silencing of Information and Consultation regulations voice requirements: avoidance,
suppression, and neglect.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY FINDINGS FOR PRACTITIONERS AND POLICY-MAKERS
• Employer silencing causes a democratic voice deficit;
• Problem of non-compliance with regulatory requirements for voice;
• Information and Consultation regulations, too weak to institutionalise voice at work, need re-casting.
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Directive were subject to employer circumvention and marginalisation. The evidence derives from the United King-
dom and Ireland, where some scholars believed the Directive would potentially hold most implication and potential
impact (Dundon, Dobbins, Hickland, Cullinane, & Donaghey, 2014). This approach follows Kaufman's (2015) call for
greater understanding of employer activity designed to stifle employee voice.
The contribution and value of the article are at two levels. First, our conceptualisation of employer silencing
offers an expanded understanding of the possibilities for voice than merely focusing on voice and voice mechanisms
alone. Voice cannot meaningfully function if denied from the information upon which valid and reliable decision-
making occurs. The concept of employer silencing, therefore, offers a useful conceptual appendage to both the voice
and silence field of study more generally. Second, the paper contributes to our understanding of the regulatory con-
text of the I&C Directive. Our analysis offers a new understanding of how the Directive failed in its objectives to
enhance voice and social dialogue at workplaces through our conceptualisation of employer silencing as a form of
regulatory non-compliance characterised by the typology of avoidance, suppression, and neglect. The next
section reviews some existing literature on silence and voice, followed by a section outlining the specific regulatory
context of the EU I&C Directive.
2 | SILENCE AND VOICE
Although the notion of employee voice is well established and understood, organisational behaviour literatures have
recently added the concept of “silence” to the conceptual repertoire of the field (; Morrison, 2011; Tangirala &
Ramanukam, 2008). Morrison and Milliken (2000) first presented the term “organisational silence” as a discrete con-
struct. These authors understood organisational silence as a collective level dynamic wherein employees withhold
their opinions and concerns about organisational problems. It is motivated by what they call a “climate of silence”,
that is, a widely shared view among employees that speaking up about issues or problems can be useless or indeed
perilous (see also Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003). Pinder and Harlos (2001) complemented this path-breaking
research by introducing the concept of “employee silence.” Employee silence offers an individual-focused lens
assessing how individual employees withhold information on work problems to persons who are perceived capable
of effecting redress. Later, Van Dyne, Ang, and Botero (2003) extended this and, building on Pinder and Harlos, pro-
posed different forms of employee silence derived from varying motives, for example, acquiescent silence based on
resignation, defensive silence based on fear of consequences, and pro-social silence based on protecting proprietary
knowledge to the benefit of the organisation (see also Brinsfield, 2014; Edmondson, 2003; Huang, Van de Vliert, &
Van der Vegt, 2005). The organisational behaviour literature's insights later migrated into the field of employment
relations (Nechanska, Hughes, & Dundon, 2018). Donaghey, Cullinane, Dundon, and Wilkinson (2011), for example,
treated silence as not simply a product of employee communicative choices but as actively engineered by employers
who fail to provide voice structures or provide those which are ineffectual, impotent, and rule out discussion on
issues of concern to employees (see also Barry et al., 2018). We might add to this the concept of employer silencing
that is where employers not only withhold information from the workforce (see on information disclosure) but also
prevent dialogue with the workforce on issues that encompass employment contract matters, job prospects, work
organisation, and the firm's economic circumstances. Arguably, employer silencing offers a more robust consideration
of the quality of employer–employee interaction than only “voice” : voice concerns itself with the provisions and
mechanisms for, as well as the calibre of, the upward provision of employee views. However, employer silencing also
looks at what employers do not themselves provide or voice via information disclosure. Failures by employers to dis-
close information, not typically considered as a strictly voice dynamic, will nonetheless impact the capacity for
informed dialogue to occur and hold significant ramifications for informed voice. There is consequently much utility
in advancing analysis of organisational silence in workplace studies, by incorporating employer silencing as the act of
withholding information and curtailing workplace dialogue.
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However, as Donaghey et al. (2011) and Barry et al. (2018) have noted, silence, like voice, is contextually and sit-
uationally specific; it can exist on some issues and not others in one organisation. For example, an employer may be
willing to discuss pay and provide a voice mechanism for such purposes but not entertain dialogue with the work-
force on introducing new workplace technology. Although silence is likely to occur where voice structures are denied
to workers altogether, it can still occur where voice mechanisms exist. Employers can dominate voice arrangements
through wielding decision-making prerogatives and self-interested agenda-setting (Butler, 2005) as well as via indi-
rect hegemonic power (Lukes, 2005). That employers might intentionally want silence rather than voice reflects that
information disclosure and dialogue is bound-up with distribution and exercise of power inside firms. There are con-
straints on employer information disclosure due to the costs not only of information processing but also the loss of
advantage vis-a-vis others. Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) suggest that there can be strong incentives for employers to
withhold information because employees in possession of greater information can use it to extract a greater share of
rents: The more information disclosed by employers, the higher the wages but the lower firm profitability and pro-
ductivity. Dialogue can reduce speed of decision-making and thwart employer strategies insofar as it provides
employees with opportunities to express voice.
3 | REGULATING FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND DIALOGUE:
THE I&C DIRECTIVE
Although some employers have an incentive to circumvent dialogue and withhold information, preferences are not
unconstrained. Employers face pressures to provide information and engage in workforce discussions via external
regulatory compulsion (Eurofound, 2016; Rogers & Streeck, 2009). Thus, regulations can provide structures for dia-
logue, as in a recognised trade union, or can require employers to provide information in the context of a transfer of
undertaking or redundancy consultation. A prominent example of regulatory requirement in this context is the
European Information & Consultation Directive transposed across EU member states in the 2000s (Adam, Purcell, &
Hall, 2016; Butler, Lavelle, Gunnigle, & O'Sullivan, 2018; Dobbins, Dundon, Cullinane, Hickland, & Donaghey, 2017;
Hall, Hutchinson, Purcell, Terry, & Parker, 2013; Hall, Purcell, Terry, Hutchinson, & Parker, 2015). The Directive seeks
to promote social dialogue via timely information and consultation through workforce-agreed structures. Under its
Standard Rules, provision of information and consultation, with a view to reaching an agreement, is required on the
recent and probable development of the undertaking's or the establishment's activities and economic situation; thus
it applies to any envisaged or probable changes that are likely to lead to substantial alterations in work organisation
or contractual relations within an undertaking or establishment.
Decentralized flexibility was allowed across member states in implementing the Directive. Due to pre-
existing legislation in most member states, many countries made little or no changes (Donaghey, Carley, Pur-
cell, & Hall, 2013). The United Kingdom and Ireland were exceptions and were important country test cases
given their weak traditions of information sharing and consultation relative to other member states (Dobbins
et al., 2017; Dundon et al., 2014; Hall & Purcell, 2012). The two jurisdictions are the focus for our examination
of regulatory impact on silence due to the Directive's significance in these contexts. Although there are differ-
ences in the detail, two broadly similar features of the implementing legislation in the United Kingdom and Ire-
land are noteworthy. First, in neither state is a positive obligation placed on business to establish employee
representative bodies. Instead, employers only respond to and establish a body when 10% of workers sign a
request for such a structure. Second, in both countries, consistent with their voluntarist traditions, provisions
allow Pre-Existing Agreement (PEA) priority over the Standard Rules. Consequently, companies that recognise
trade unions or a pre-existing non-union employee representation scheme can claim this as the mechanism for
fulfilling the Directives' requirements, provided it is agreed with workforce representatives (although in Ireland a
cut-off point for claiming a PEA before legislative enactment was required). Where PEAs do not exist, negotia-
tions commence to agree to a structure; where negotiations fail within a specified timeframe (see Table 1), a
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default to the Standard Rules is applied. The intent, structure, processes, and content implied by the Directive,
and written into the transposed laws in both jurisdictions, are summarised in Table 1.
Studies of the Directive in the United Kingdom and Ireland show limited impacts on information and consultation
practices (Cullinane & Donaghey, 2014; Dobbins et al., 2017; Hall et al., 2013, 2015). The work of (Hall et al. 2013;
Hall & Purcell, 2012) sought to distinguish between firms that actively responded to the regulations but used the regu-
lations in diverse ways. Some firms became “active consulters,” positively engaging with the regulations; others took an
instrumental view and used it for downward communication. Other companies adhered to the regulations by
implementing appropriate structures, but these fell into disuse over time and became defunct. The focus in this paper is
different to that of existing work; however, it is not concerned with describing the way different employers used the
regulations to construct consultation structures and disclose information, but rather with how the intended benchmark
of the Directive could be circumvented by employers so that silences prevailed on items under regulatory remit. In
effect, we show how the regulations became marginalised through a plethora of non-compliance routes constituting
employer silencing of employee voice, enabling employers to dominate and occupy this regulatory space.
We propose three principal ways the Directive was diluted or negated along a spectrum of activity, ranging from
simply hoping to remain unnoticed by regulatory agencies to engaging in the act of regulatory pretence. In effect,
employers were able to withhold information and circumvent dialogue despite regulatory requirements intending to
establish their precise opposite. The categories of regulatory non-compliance we propose are avoidance, suppression,
and neglect. By avoidance, we mean employers can elude the regulations to ensure the type of information sharing and
dialogue it stipulates does not take place. In undertaking avoidance, the employer will hope to go unobserved or under
the radar to avoid regulatory oversight (see, for example, Bloor & Sampson, 2009; Jaehrling & Mehaut, 2012). However,
in those cases where employers can no longer go unnoticed from regulatory requirements, recalcitrant employers may
counter-mobilise by seeking to suppress attempted compliance via obstruction and flouting (see for example Gall, 2010).
In contrast, other employers, instead of avoidance and suppression, may engage in the act of neglect (Farrell,
1983; Kolarska & Aldrich, 1980). Apathy and passive disengagement exemplify the route of neglect as employers'
TABLE 1 Benchmark for information and consultation as set by Directive and National Regulations for
United Kingdom and Ireland
Intent • For employer to work in a spirit of co-operation with workforce representatives and with due
regard for their reciprocal rights and obligations in providing agreed structures for information
and consultation.
 I&C Directive Preamble 6, 7, 8 and 9 and Article 1(3), Employee Provision of information and
Consultation Act (EPICA) 2006 Section 12 (Ireland); Information and Consultation of Employee
(ICE) Regulations 2004, Section 21 (UK)
Structures • In putting in place I&C structure, the employer should ensure it is formally agreed with
representatives of employees.
 I&C Directive Preamble, 23, EPICA 2006, Section 7, 8 and 9; ICE 2004, Part III Negotiated Agreements
Processes • For the employer to provide information in a timely fashion to enable employees to acquaint
themselves with the subject matter and to examine it.
• For the employer to enter consultation; the exchange of views and the establishment of dialogue
 I&C Directive Article 2 and 4; EPICA 2006 Section 1; ICE 2004, Part 1(2)
Content • Information on the recent and probable development of the undertaking's or the establishment's
activities and economic situation;
• Information and consultation on the situation, structure, and probable development of
employment within the undertaking or establishment and on any anticipatory measures envisaged
• Information and consultation on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work
organisation or in contractual relations
• I&C Directive Article 4(2); EPICA 2006 Section 10; ICE 2004 Part IV where parties unable to
agree information and consultation practices within a specified time period (3 months Ireland,
6 months United Kingdom) of opening negotiations.
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commitment to the spirit and practice of the regulations is low and not in accord with principles of acting in good
faith. However, employers in this scenario are likely to be caught in a half-way house between wanting to ignore the
regulations entirely and needing to maintain some pretence of compliance, if only to avoid punitive penalisation via
regulatory oversight. A minimalist level of acknowledgement is thus likely to exist, but in substantive terms, regula-
tory compliance is marginalised and abandoned over time.
4 | CASES AND METHODS
The article uses illustrative cases from a study of employer responses to the information and consultation regulations
in the United Kingdom and Ireland to demonstrate how avoidance, suppression, and neglect could preserve employer
silencing of employee voice despite regulatory requirements to do otherwise. Specifically, the paper presents three
cases on a post facto basis that exhibit how regulatory circumvention operationalised in response to the I&C Direc-
tive. Fieldwork for all cases derives from the period between 2008 and 2014.
4.1 | The cases
The first case is an American-owned non-union multinational company operating in the contract catering sector
in the Republic and Northern Ireland. This organisation, called CateringCo., employed 4,000 employees in over
400 sites. The majority of workers are catering assistants and paid minimum wage rates on a mix of full-time,
part-time, temporary, and zero-hours contracts. The HRM function was centralised at a head office in Dublin,
with auxiliary support in three regional offices. Site managers at local level tended to deal with HRM issues as
they arose. Although the company was non-union, one of the larger general unions attempted to organise
workers at some of its sites. Although the employer did not grant recognition, unofficially recognised union rep-
resentatives in a tiny minority of sites actively dealt with individual grievances. Collective consultation was
non-existent, and information was predominantly downward communication from management. The case illus-
trates regulatory avoidance.
The second case is from the medical device manufacturing sector in the Republic of Ireland. ManufactureCo.
is an American-owned non-union multinational company employing 3,000 employees at the facility researched.
Eighty percent of the staff were semi-skilled assembly line operatives, with the remainder in back-office support
functions. This employer pursued many elements of “best practice” HRM, such as selective hiring, teamwork,
culture management, and performance-related pay. However, there was no tradition of collective consultation
with employees, whereas information disclosure on employment relations matters took the form of downward
communication via line management. The paper presents ManufactureCo.'s response to the regulations as evi-
dence of regulatory suppression.
The third case is ConcreteCo. from the construction industry, a diversified building materials provider,
manufacturing and supplying product to the construction industry. The company employed approximately
2,000 employees across 15 sites in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland at the time of fieldwork. HRM
in the company was decentralised to local level, and there was correspondingly a patchwork of union and non-
union sites with varying terms and conditions of employment. Seventy percent of employees were classed as
direct labour, although this comprised a broad range of skilled trades and unskilled load handlers. Among this
grade, approximately 50% were union members spread across three unions. Before the Directive's transposi-
tion, the primary collective employment relations structure was the centralised pay negotiations structure
utilised on a bi-annual basis. Information provision varied across sites but predominately occurred through
downward communication from management. In terms of its response to the regulations, ConcreteCo. offers an
exemplar of regulatory neglect.
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4.2 | Fieldwork methods
The fieldwork deployed two research instruments: semi-structured interviews and documentary content analysis.
Interviews were with employer representatives (mainly, the human resource director, senior, and line management),
employees, and where existing, union or non-union representatives. Interviews focused on information and consulta-
tion practices in use, why they were in use, awareness and assessment of the regulations, actions taken in response
to the regulations, if any, and evaluation of information and consultation practices in situ at the company/site. Docu-
mentation such as management circulars, minutes of meetings, and constitutions of information and consultation
forum provided evidence on the structure, process, and content of workplace dialogue.
Table 2 summarises the evidence sources. At CateringCo., information derives from interviews with 16 senior
managers, including the human resource director, human resource support staff at the national level, 3 regional HR
managers, and 11 site managers. Across four of the locations, the research team interviewed 27 catering assistants
as well as 3 union representatives (2 site stewards and 1 sectoral officer with responsibility for the company). Docu-
mentation on internal HRM policy, procedure, and examples of staff communication was also acquired.
At ManufactureCo., a dispute over employee attempts to trigger the regulations via the 10% request generated
contact with several employee representatives, who provided a sample of internal documentation on the company's
response to the regulations. The documentation included up to 50 documents outlining the dispute over the regula-
tions, the employer's response to statutory bodies, and information regarding the workforce and employees initiating
the trigger. Some of this documentation was in the form of emails, postal correspondence, internal circulars, and
intranet documentation. The documents form the basis for the material presented in the case alongside interviews
with seven employees active in the dispute and who represented the trigger campaign.
In ConcreteCo., the fieldwork incorporated 20 interviews. The schedule of interviews included eight management
representatives, including the national human resource director, one regional human resource manager and six site
managers. Four employee representatives, three union and one non-union, were also interviewed, whereas in one site,
eight direct labourers, selected by management to represent employee categories on-site, were interviewed. The field-
work also accessed documentation on company HRM policies and internal joint consultative committee minutes.
4.3 | Analysis
Data analysis followed protocols appropriate to case study design, suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2018).
Conceptual categories became subject to a coding protocol of identifying cases consistent with the categories of
regulatory circumvention categories. The coding was a refining process that underwent several rounds of review.
The research checked and cross-referenced the coding of both interview reports and documentary results after
TABLE 2 Case sources
Case Route to silence Characteristic
Evidence source
Interviews Documents
CateringCo. Avoid Services/hospitality sector
4,000 employees across 400 sites across Ireland
46 —
ManufactureCo. Suppress Medical devices sector
4,000 employees in Republic of Ireland
7 50
ConcreteCo. Neglect Construction sector
2000 employees across 15 sites across Ireland
20 65
73 115
Note: In bold to draw attention to calculation of total figures.
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the fieldwork to ensure validity, accuracy, and consistency of interpretation and analysis. Cases cover prior back-
ground information on information and consultation before the Directive; the response of employers to regula-
tions and their intentions for information and consultation; and the resulting structures, processes, and content of
information and consultation.
5 | CASE FINDINGS
Earlier, we outlined the Directive's regulatory benchmarks for the meaningful delivery of information sharing and dia-
logue in the workplace. Such benchmarks sought to foster behavioural patterns on intent, structures, processes, and
content. This section outlines how employers could circumvent these benchmarks via our typology of avoidance,
suppression, and neglect, amounting to forms of employer silencing. Table 3 provides a comparative summary of reg-
ulatory objectives and actual results in each firm per the type of regulatory non-compliance the employer pursued.
TABLE 3 Benchmarking employer information provision and workforce dialogue against regulatory requirement
Regulatory requirement
(see also Table 1) CateringCo. “avoidance”
ManufactureCo.
“suppression” ConcreteCo. “neglect”
Intent Spirit of cooperation Sought to avoid the
regulations by going
unnoticed and
maintain existing
arrangements (as
below)
Presented appearance of
compliance initially
before ignoring
agency's request for
evidential proof and
ignoring procedural
timelines for
negotiation in bid to
maintain control over
I&C process
Employer reported no
action taken as
pre-existing
structures assessed
as satisfactory with
reportedly low level
interest in
consultation
Structures Agreed with
representatives
No agreed structures Employer designed
structures unilaterally
despite protests from
representatives of 10%
request campaign;
presented proposals to
employee body for
referendum
Structures at local level
held to comply with
regulatory
requirement existed
on discretion of local
management were
not formally agreed
Processes Timely provision of
information with
opportunity to
exchange views and
establish dialogue (with
view to reaching
agreement)
Downward information
to employees via
individual
communication, team
briefings at the start of
a shift, site notice
boards, and/or
appraisals
I&C structure specifies
opportunity for
information and
consultation
Bias to information
provision although
consultation with
employee health and
safety
representatives
Consultation “not well
developed”
according to
employer
Content Economic activities,
development of
employment, and
decisions on changes
in work organisation or
contractual relations
Downward information
flows from employer
on individual
performance,
operational schedules
and working time rotas
Employer designed
constitution specifies
items covered in
Directive's standard
rules
Information on health
and safety and work
reorganisation
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5.1 | Avoidance at CateringCo.
Our typology of non-conformance indicated that avoidance results in silence where an employer has success-
fully dodged the regulations to ensure the type of information sharing and dialogue it stipulates never occurs.
Employer non-compliance goes unnoticed by all other interested parties, enabling the preservation of struc-
tures, processes, and associated content that are out of sync with regulatory expectations. In our fieldwork,
employer representatives at CateringCo. were aware of the regulations in the period before transposition and
enactment but opted not to alter practices. The senior human resource (HR) manager for operations in the
Republic claimed the company had been “nervous” about the intent of the regulations when first noted in the
early 2000s. CateringCo. intentions towards information and consultation and their own preferred practice in
this context were confined to an exclusively management determined and controlled structure of direct down-
ward communication with staff on content relating to individual performance, operational schedules, and work-
ing time rotas. The employer accepted that there was no agreed structure on information and consultation, so
they did not claim to have a PEA. HRM respondents maintained that they were unclear how such an agreement
would occur given the geographical spread of site locations and the relatively small numbers of employees at
each site; logistical issues of coordinating an agreement were claimed as problematic. Thus, the process by
which downward communication occurred was via a mixture of individual one-on-ones, team briefings at the
start of a shift, site notice boards, and formal appraisals. There was no structure or process in place for collective
employee voice, whereas avenues for individual employees to raise matters varied greatly at site level, being
contingent on individual management receptiveness. In a few sites, unofficially recognised union representa-
tives existed, participating in grievance or disciplinary hearings if a member so requested. However, any
management-union meetings occurred off-site, and shop stewards could not circulate any union material
on site.
Local management did not inform American headquarters of potential developments associated with the
regulations. Local management, as the HR Director put it, did not want to “alarm” American headquarters,
which might lead to more significant intervention from abroad, something management at national-level
wanted to avoid. The employer's intent towards the Directive was to take a “wait and see” approach. Ulti-
mately, the HR Director described the final form of the transposition process as “allaying fears” among
CateringCo. management about maintaining the status quo: No change would arise unless requested, enabling
the above status quo in structure, process, and content to prevail. The employee population was assumed by
management to be uninterested in the regulatory rights and employer representatives at the site level
reported confidence in proceeding with their own employer determined structures, processes, and associated
content unless otherwise challenged. Absence of any meaningful regulatory oversight meant that avoidance
was a low-risk option for the employer.
Despite the claim that local-level interest among employees in the regulations would be low, the HR Director
reported concern that unions might use the regulations in the Republic of Ireland to establish a foothold at site-level
by organising the workforce to trigger the regulations, introducing a more formal collective structure to strengthen
union presence in the company. At the time of research, a general union was organising in the catering and hospital-
ity sector and recruited members in the company. Yet the employers' concern proved unfounded; field research at
various sites observed that aside from only one shop steward, union activists were unaware of the regulations and
the full-time officer who played an adjunct role assisting CateringCo. stewards displayed no interest in the Directive,
leaving the employer free to avoid regulatory purview. Nonetheless, the employer remained wary of the union using
the regulations and an indicator of that intent was their vetting of the research interview schedules to ensure field-
work avoided raising the issue of regulatory rights with staff. Furthermore, the national headquarters changed the
interview schedules to remove any reference to “consultation,” which the research conceded for access. Representa-
tives from the national HR office explained this action because they did not wish to create “unmanageable expecta-
tions” among employees.
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5.2 | Suppression at ManufactureCo.
Whereas the actions by CateringCo. evidences an example of an employer who went unnoticed, other
employers' non-compliance can be exposed and subjected to requests for change in the direction of the regu-
lations. Employers hostile in intent to the cooperative tendencies of the Directive's information disclosure and
workplace dialogue provisions can, however, suppress attempted compliance via the deliberate obstruction of
the source requesting the change, that is, employees and relevant regulatory agencies. In this regard, Man-
ufactureCo. represents a case of suppression generated in response to a trigger request by 10% of employees
in 2009. Prior to this request, there had been no structure of collective consultation. Instead, employer unilat-
eralism held sway alongside a culture of minimalist information disclosure. Top-down communication directed
at individuals or work cells regarding shift patterns and line mobility came with little advance notice of man-
agement intentions and no consultation. The structure and process for information disclosure tended to be at
the level of individual one-to-ones with supervisors. Employees involved in the trigger request reported such
one-to-ones as dependent on personal relationships with supervisors.
The trigger request to initiate regulatory compliance was advanced via the statutory agency (Labour Court)
with responsibility for disputes associated with the legislation. The employer responded to the Court's notifica-
tion to follow regulatory procedure by first claiming it already had a Forum, a PEA setup in 2005. In the week
after the Court's notification, details of the Forum were communicated via a desktop folder on the staff intra-
net. A constitution for the forum was contained in the folder; however, this document specified that it was
established in 2006. A week later, updated intranet documentation claimed the Forum was set up in 2004,
followed by a revised version of the constitution removing the date altogether, and the process and content of
the body were rephrased. The Forum was first presented as a body “to facilitate two-way communication,” later
revised to “facilitate communication of information and consultation.” It was not agreed by employee represen-
tatives nor was there evidence on how employees approved it. The employer ignored a written request by the
Court to have the PEA voluntarily verified, as the latter did not have powers to compel evidence under the leg-
islation. The employer later confirmed in documentation to the activists that it “could not find” a signed, dated
copy of the alleged PEA but that this did not “disprove” it did not have one. The employer ignored requests to
initiate negotiations on an information and consultation structure in line with regulatory requirements and pres-
ented its preferred Forum as a fait accompli. Appointment, rather than election, of representatives transpired;
the majority of whom were staff operating in support functions rather than shop floor operatives. Thus,
employer action in this case was characterised first by attempted obfuscation to undermine the legitimate trig-
ger request before turning to a reliance on management fiat to steamroll a preferred course of non-cooperation
with the trigger campaign and avoidance of negotiation to introduce an I&C structure under regulatory
auspices.
The employer appointed two of the employees involved in requesting compliance to sit on the Forum. Their par-
ticipation, however, proved disputatious: They obstructed forum meetings from proceeding smoothly because the
body was not compliant with the I&C regulations. Employee representatives contended that the period of 3 months
for negotiating had elapsed and the Standard Rules should now apply. The employer responded by suspending the
Forum, reporting its intentions to hold a plant-wide referendum to settle the matter on whether the company's pre-
ferred Forum should remain or the Standard Rules formula should apply. The employer circulated, before the refer-
endum, an information sheet outlining a series of questions and answers on the purpose of the referendum. The
same sheet also detailed apparent differences between the I&C structures of the Information Forum and the Stan-
dard Rules and their intended content. Differences were minor, although the definition of consultation processes
was stronger in the Standard Rules, emphasising “consultation with a view to reaching agreement,” a prescription
absent in the Information Forum's constitution. The referendum process, however, was reported by activists to be
highly tainted by employer threats that if the Standard Rules were adopted, the American owners' investment in the
plant would suffer.
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No formal declaration on/of the referendum results was ever provided by the employer, apart from digital notice
boards on-site reporting that the majority of those who voted, voted for the Information Forum. An attempt by the
activists to secure figures on voting distributions was unsuccessful, as was a request to the external auditor who
oversaw the election. The only documentary evidence on voting distribution available is a report by the company in
later correspondence with an employment tribunal on a separate matter relating to an unfair dismissal claim by one
of the employees behind the request for I&C rights. The correspondence claimed 66% of staff voted for the Forum
over the Standard Rules. Within 12 months of the initial request, the company dismissed two employees linked with
the trigger campaign for alleged work absences, although they later claimed victimisation by the employer (securing
an out of tribunal settlement in both cases). Their exit from the organisation ended the campaign for regulatory
compliance.
5.3 | Neglect at ConcreteCo.
Avoidance and suppression represent, in their respective ways, active forms of regulatory non-compliance.
However, as outlined earlier, employers can adopt a more passive form of non-compliance characterised by
minimalist acknowledgement of the regulatory requirement and but not conforming with the regulatory spirit.
ConcreteCo. constituted a case of regulatory neglect. Employer representatives in both Northern Ireland and
the Republic reported awareness of the Directive but were sceptical of its value or expressed disinterest, partic-
ularly when it became clear that alterations to existing I&C practices were voluntary or required initiatives from
below. When asked if any action was taken in response to the regulations to ascertain employer intent,
employer representatives maintained the company did not need to undertake new actions. The employer's view
was that ConcreteCo. had in place appropriate structures and processes at a national and local level that would
suffice as “pre-existing agreements”:
We wouldn't have gone through a process of having to put in place arrangements to comply with the
Information and Consultation Directive. It hasn't had a major effect on us here. We were aware of it,
but felt we didn't need to do anything with it. That legislation was badly worded and it didn't really
give clear guidance. We were already doing most of it anyway.
(HR Director, Northern Ireland)
The employer representatives acknowledged that, apart from health and safety, consultation was not, as
assessed by the HR Director in Northern Ireland, necessarily “well developed” in the company and regarded as an
“overhead”; employer communication tended to dominate or, for the unionised sites, centralise pay bargaining. In
explaining intent and existing structures, employer representatives identified that each site was autonomous on
information sharing and workplace dialogue practices, adopting their own structures for information disclosure and
dialogue. Such practices typically derived from site-level inherited traditions and the intent of the local-level man-
agement as to whether information share and dialogue were “a good thing or not” (HR Director, Northern Ireland).
The structures were thus unilaterally determined by management, were not formally agreed with workforce repre-
sentatives, and were ultimately dependent on the vagaries of different local manager's intent as to how often the
structure met and whether it existed at all. Some sites evidenced “works committees,” typically forums for
addressing content on production and operational matters like the site-level layout of stock and materials. Other
sites had health and safety committees, which tended towards formalised reviews and discussions on the content
of risk assessments, associated regulatory requirements, and the reporting of defects on site by either manage-
ment or the health and safety representative. In terms of composition, some committees had an employee
representative—nearly always an appointed health and safety officer—and others did not, whereas some were
entirely composed of management or senior engineers and supervisors.
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Although health and safety representatives were available on nearly all sites, content involving information dis-
closure, or dialogue on content-like financial circumstances, employment developments and contractual matters was
non-existent in the non-union sites, whereas work organisation was discussed only in considering changing opera-
tional or layout requirements for new production. Yet, where this occurred, the process was reported by both
employer and employee representatives as a process of downward communication rather than collective consulta-
tion. Even in the unionised sites, process characteristic of information disclosure and dialogue on content outside of
pay was negligible. Despite relatively high density, site-level unionism was confined to individual grievance and disci-
plinary issues. Pay negotiations were centralised at the national level with bi-annual wage agreements balloted on by
members. Trade unionists, however, reported that consultation was absent on non-pay issues like organisational
change and new technology. Despite this, unions showed no inclination in utilising the I&C regulations to effect
changes in practice: An attitude driven by a combination of union disinterest in (and lack of awareness of) the regula-
tions and a view that initiating new patterns of consultation would likely disrupt settled collective bargaining rela-
tionships with the employer.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Existing organisational silence-voice literature (Barry et al., 2018; Brinsfield, 2014; Morrison, 2011) largely confines
itself to focusing on how employees withhold information and refrain from speaking up, arguably resulting in the
mistaken perception that organisational silence is employee-led. As a corrective, the novel conceptual insight in this
article is to extend the silence concept to reveal how employers withhold information and curtail workplace dialogue
and opportunities for employees to have a say. It is the first research to present the concept of employer silencing.
Significantly, this is analytically distinct from extrapolating the presence or absence of employee voice policies and
practice and also differs from workers remaining silent in response to management. The agency and process of
employer silencing of employee voice produce weaker voice outcomes than may be intended by state regulatory
requirements, facilitating employer dominance and occupation of regulatory space (Hancher & Moran, 1989).
The article considered how employers responded to regulatory requirements intended to encourage dialogue
and employee voice at work, by pursuing the opposite outcome by silencing workers' voice opportunities. Specifi-
cally examining the European Information & Consultation Directive and national regulations in the United Kingdom
and Ireland, we proposed three routes to employer silencing: avoidance, suppression, and neglect. These were then
evidenced in practice to three matched cases of employer responses. The intent of the Directive was to encourage
information disclosure and consultation in a spirit of cooperation to be realised via agreed structures, processes, and
content agreed with workforce representatives (Butler et al., 2018; Dobbins et al., 2017; Hall et al., 2013). Instead of
assessing how the regulations were used, as existing research has already examined, the evidence in this article con-
sidered how the regulatory space for I&C was circumvented by employers in three case studies. Although each firm
adopted different means, none of the three cases could be said to align to key elements of the regulatory require-
ments, although some cases do so more than others.
Rather, each case perpetuated different traditions and practices characterised by weak to non-existent informa-
tion sharing on employment relations matters and avoidance or minimisation of consultation. Despite the aspirational
ambit of the Directive to encourage information and consultation on substantive items, employers could avoid or
limit this from occurring in the cases studied, partly through weak and minimalist regulatory design at national level
and via the different forms of non-compliance adopted at organisational level. The organisational silence that tradi-
tionally existed in these firms could be largely preserved or moderated only slightly, whereas structures for informa-
tion disclosure and consultative dialogue could be avoided or neutered. A crucial influence in driving the pattern of
regulatory non-conformance at firm level is the employers' intent. Negative intentions towards the Directive provide
the space in which non-conforming structures, processes, and associated content prevail. It is not so much that a par-
ticular intent of avoidance, suppression, or neglect dictate a specific pattern of structure, process, and content, which
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themselves are a product of employer preference and organisational custom, but rather that the intent of non-
conformance guarantees the aspirations of the Directive will fall short. Silence on issues specified by the legislation
thus go unobserved. The employer at CateringCo. saw the Directive as damaging the preferred status quo of man-
agement controlled downward communication and was therefore keen to evade its infringement into the workplace.
Opting for avoidance was viable given the light-touch monitoring by regulatory agencies and improbability of an
employee trigger in this context. Avoidance ensured that existing employer preferences for limited information share
and non-consultation remained. ‘At ManufactureCo. the Directive became a live issue at firm level when
employees attempted to utilise the trigger mechanism to establish an independently elected employee forum as
set out in the I&C regulations.’ The employer, seemingly wedded to unilateral prerogative in designing internal
information share and dialogue structures, opted for suppression of regulatory procedure initiated by the
employee trigger. The intention to suppress the possibility of a joint regulatory space on information and consulta-
tion resulted in the employer steamrolling through procedural requirements to negotiate. Even though nominally
the firm ended up with an I&C structure that mimicked much of the Directive, it was principally a creature of the
employer rather than a jointly negotiated one. Given the context of suppressionary intent in which the structure
was born, the likelihood that it will replicate the Directive's spirit of cooperation and good faith dialogue seemed
remote. Employer awareness at ConcreteCo. that the Directive had limited regulatory teeth alongside weak
prioritisation of workforce consultation encouraged a lackadaisical approach. Characterising this approach were
claims that existing practice was sufficient, enabling employers to neglect the Directive and any readjustment of
their existing behaviour. The result of such complacency and disinterest was the continued provision of ad hoc
structures, processes, and content driven by local managers perceived needs. These structures tended to be
underwhelming relative to what the Directive championed. The employer neither felt the need to avoid the Direc-
tive's purview actively nor faced any requirement for suppression. In the face of the relatively non-intrusive regu-
lations, casual regulatory neglect could persist.
Thus, in none of the companies could the benchmark set out by the Directive be found: Organisational silence
persisted in the realm of structures and processes for social dialogue, whereas the types of content aspired to by the
Directive for dialogue went undiscussed, or as in the case of Manufacture Co., were raised under conditions of veiled
threats about job loss. The intent of the Directive was not achieved because employers were not committed to the
regulatory spirit of meaningful social dialogue and opted for avoidance, suppression, and neglect.
The implications of employers perpetuating the withholding of information and neutering social dialogue are
workplaces with a significant democratic voice deficit (Hyman, 2016; Timming, 2015). Several important implications
arise, which could inform both future research and policy. In terms of research, the responses of avoidance, suppres-
sion, and neglect could be operationalised further to determine why one is adopted over the other, that is, why do
some employers calculate at least the pretence of regulatory compliance and others simply avoid it? Is the adopted
form contingent on the type of regulation? Or could different combinations of response be simultaneously utilised in
the same situation? Our study of the I&C Directive and transposed national regulations suggests prevailing work-
place traditions, and employer views on the legitimacy of disclosure and dialogue are important influencers of subse-
quent responses. Employer responses of avoidance, suppression, and neglect might be further considered vis-à-vis
more robust (or harder) regulatory forms. Other regulations may be less amenable to local-level creativity in how
conformance is secured and may be more stringently monitored and enforced. The I&C Directive, via national-level
transposition in two liberal market economies, provided ample scope for employer innovation at local level; other
regulations might be less permissive. Would some regulations minimise the capacity for avoidance or become prone
to neglect?
This links to policy, because if non-compliance can occur in the forms outlined here, it is necessary to ask what
would make regulatory conformance more likely? As neglect and suppression imply, conformance is no easy matter
of simple verification and suggests close local-level observation, and monitoring are necessary. Yet this may be
beyond the resources of most regulatory authorities. Local actors like workers or unions may not have the inclination
or capability to carry this burden. For example, employers, in opting for avoidance, are operating on the premise that
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there is a lack of countervailing forces at the firm level to constrain such behaviour. Where suppression is favoured,
employers are likely to calculate that the balance of forces locally favour their ability to circumvent potential threats
to the status quo. The act of neglect would appear to work on the assumption that there is little appetite or momen-
tum to alter existing arrangements. As regulatory actors, unions could conceivably attempt to alter such patterns.
Where unions find avoidance, they could expose the prevailing regime of silence by highlighting alternative and
legally backed possibilities. Faced with suppression, unions could counter-mobilise members at firm-level around the
incursion on employee rights or call upon the aid of state powers to bolster their position locally. Confronted with
neglect, unions could direct energies towards revamping deficient bodies by encouraging local activism or making a
case to management around potential mutual gains or the risks of their transgression. However, such responses to
regulatory non-conformance types assume unions have an interest in policing the prevalence of silence on these
matters. In our cases, unions were mostly disinterested in regulatory compliance on this issue. It is already docu-
mented that unions can potentially see I&C Forums associated with the Directive as a potential competitor and that
their commitments lay towards collective bargaining rather than information disclosure and non-bargaining forms of
workplace dialogue (Dundon et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2015). Indeed, in the neglect case, unions were happy to allow
this situation to exist for fear of disrupting exist bargaining arrangements on pay, whereas in the avoidance case, the
union evidenced disinterest in the regulations as a whole (which seems to be why local activists remained ignorant
of the legislation). As indicated by Bales, Bogg, and Novitz (2018), other regulations may prove more successful in
securing employer compliance; where there are considerable transgression costs, workplace actors are informed of
their relevant rights and responsibilities and the assessment of compliance is more transparent and identifiable.
Employers themselves might be mindful that although non-compliance can be expedient, the risk of exposure if regu-
latory requirements are breached might not only be subject to transgression costs and fines but potentially negative
employment and public relations consequences.
To conclude, this article has advanced novel theoretical insights on employer silencing of voice.
Organisational silence is much more than simply workers choosing whether or not to speak out but is driven by
employer preferences regarding information sharing and workplace dialogue. Therefore, employer silencing pro-
vides an important new research avenue, which other employment relations and HRM scholars could also
explore in different empirical contexts. The article also highlights that employer silencing and regulatory non-
compliance are an important public policy matter for the state and its agencies, as well as for HR and employ-
ment relations practitioners.
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